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Abstract
Expert judgements are essential when time and resources are stretched or we face novel dilemmas requiring fast solutions.
Good advice can save lives and large sums of money. Typically, experts are defined by their qualifications, track record and
experience [1,2]. The social expectation hypothesis argues that more highly regarded and more experienced experts will give
better advice. We asked experts to predict how they will perform, and how their peers will perform, on sets of questions.
The results indicate that the way experts regard each other is consistent, but unfortunately, ranks are a poor guide to actual
performance. Expert advice will be more accurate if technical decisions routinely use broadly-defined expert groups,
structured question protocols and feedback.
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Introduction
Expert judgments are attractive when time and resources are
stretched, and are essential where data are inadequate, circum-
stances are unique, or extrapolations are required for novel, future
and uncertain situations. Typically, experts are defined by their
qualifications, track record and experience [1], [2]. People believe
that experts have privileged access to knowledge and use it
effectively [3], [4]. Society generally, and experts in particular,
expect that more experienced, better-qualified and more highly
regarded experts perform better when estimating facts within their
domain of expertise. We call this the social expectation hypothesis.
Many scientific disciplines including ecology, health and
engineering routinely depend on expert scientific judgments [5],
[6], [7]. The growing recognition of expert judgment is underlined
by recent innovations in methods for obtaining and combining
expert estimates [8], [9]. Social expectations of expert perfor-
mance appear to be well founded. Expert estimates of facts are
generally better than lay estimates, within the expert’s area of
expertise [10], [11], [12]. Judgments have been shown to improve
with experience in domains as diverse as physics and weather
forecasting [12], [13].
However, these examples are from contexts in which feedback is
direct, personal, unambiguous and immediate, from which the
experts learn. For example, the judgments of weather forecasters
are attributed to the person making them, and their predictions
are verified by events in the following days. Extrapolations about
expert performance in relation to experience may be misleading if
applied to all expert judgments. For example, for either relatively
complex or relatively simple problems, experts don’t outperform
novices as they do for intermediate problems [14], although what
qualifies as complex is context specific and may be difficult to
determine a priori. Experts may perform poorly when knowledge
environments are lenient, feedback is weak, or experts are required
to adapt to new situations [12], [15]. In addition, experts (and lay
people) are sensitive to a range of psychological idiosyncrasies,
subjective biases, values and conflicts of interest [6], [11], [16],
[17].
Previous studies have demonstrated that better-calibrated and
more accurate judgments can result from systems that provide
feedback about performance, encourage experts to think about
their estimates and aggregate individual estimates [12], [18], [19],
[20], [21], [22]. However, no study previously has related actual
performance, qualifications, track record and experience to both
self-assessments and peer expectations of performance.
The purpose of this research is to test the social expectation
hypothesis by examining the relationship between perception of
expertise and the actual performance of scientific experts on test
questions about facts. As is explained below, the hypothesis
predicts strong correlations between, i) self and peer assessments,
ii) peer assessments and experience, publications and qualifica-
tions, and iii) peer ranks and actual performance. We tested the
hypothesis by comparing self-assessment with peer assessment of
expected performance in groups of experienced life-science
professionals, and by examining the relationships between
attributes of expertise and expert estimates of relevant facts.
This information was gathered in six structured elicitation
exercises [1], [18] involving 123 experts (124 participated and
123 provided responses) from life science fields including
medicine, epidemiology, veterinary science, ecology and conser-
vation biology.
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We developed a structured procedure for questioning experts
based on the methods of Cooke [18], [19] and Speirs-Bridge et al.
[23]. This approach is designed to ameliorate the effect of
dominant individuals in a group and mitigate some of the most
pervasive and influential sources of bias including anchoring,
dominance and overconfidence [11], [12], [16], [17].
Elicitation protocol
Questions from the knowledge domain of groups of experts
were used to test the performance of people along a continuum of
expertise. Experts were selected by the people organizing the
workshops in each case, and were included because of their
relevant technical experience and training for the problem under
consideration. We obtained approval for this project from the
University of Melbourne’s Ethics Committee and written approval
of informed consent from all participants. Experts were provided
with five to ten factual questions relevant to their expertise. To
handle variation in response scales for each question, we first
range-coded the estimates by each expert for each question. We
then rescaled the answers to ameliorate the influence of outliers
(see below). Standardization was important to ensure that each
question contributed more or less equally to overall assessments of
group performance. The rescaling described below provided a
measure of deviation of each expert’s estimate from the true value
that was not dominated by a single prediction far from the
observed value. The procedure was as follows:
1. Participants in a facilitated workshop situation completed a
survey that documented their training, experience in the
relevant area, professional role, memberships and publications.
2. Participants provided one another with a brief verbal summary
of their training, professional experience and current role.
Participants were then asked to privately rank themselves and
the other participants on an 11-point scale (0= ‘no expertise’,
5= ‘moderate expertise’, 10= ‘highly expert’), representing
how well they expected themselves and others to perform on
test questions relevant to the topic of the meeting. We used the
average of the values for each expert assigned by other experts
as a measure of status.
3. A set of ‘fair’ questions [18] was developed from pre-
publication experimental results, regulatory data bases and
other relevant sources. The reasonableness of the questions was
confirmed by one of the participants, usually the person who
arranged the meeting.
4. The questions asked for quantities, natural frequencies [24]
and probabilities using a four step procedure [23] in the
following format:
a. Realistically, what is the lowest the value could be?
b. What is the highest the value could be?
c. What is your best guess (the most likely value)?
d. How confident are you that the interval you provided
contains the truth (give a value between 50% and 100%)?
5. Participants completed each question by hand on paper
questionnaires, resulting in an initial, private estimate of each
fact.
6. The full set of individual estimates was displayed to the group
visually (transformed to be 80% credible bounds around the
best guess) using software developed for this process. The
rescaling to an 80% interval assumed normal, lognormal or
triangular distributions, depending on the context and data.
Alternative assumptions were not critical as they did not make
much difference to the visual display. Differences were
discussed, question by question, with the aid of the facilitator.
Participants were given the opportunity to resolve the
meanings of words, specify context, and introduce and cross-
examine relevant information.
7. Participants then provided a second, final private answer to
each question.
Expert workshops
The procedure was applied to groups ranging in size from 13 to
25 professionals, meeting to discuss health and biosecurity issues,
to participate in training, and to estimate facts for risk assessments
(Table 1). The participants represented disciplines including
medicine, epidemiology, animal and plant health, ecology and
conservation biology. Expertise in each group ranged from highly
credentialed people with many years experience to relative novices
with modest relevant training.
We applied appropriate questions to professional groups in six
workshops, between February and December 2010. Workshops
Table 1. Characteristics of the expert groups.
Workshop Discipline
Numbe of
experts Location/Date
Range of years
of relevant
experience Range of qualifications
Range of
number of
publications
1 Animal and plant biosecurity
and quarantine
21 Melbourne, February 2010 0–37 BSc, BASc, BVSc, BCom,
Grad. Dip., MSc, PhD
0–113
2 Animal and plant
biosecurity
24 Christchurch, March 2010 0–39 BSc, MSc, MBA,
MCom, PhD
0–270
3 Ecology, frog biology 13 Melbourne, March, 2010 0–42 BA, BSc, BSc (Hons),
M Env Studies, PhD
0–45
4 Public health, medicine 25 Canberra, May 2010 0–45 BEng, BSc, BEcon, LLB,
MBBS, Grad. Dip., MA,
MSc, MBA, PhD
0–220
5 Risk analysis, biosecurity 20 Sydney, September 2010 0–40 BEng, BSc, BVSc, MBBS,
Grad. Dip., MA, MBA, PhD
0–225
6 Weed ecology 20 Melbourne, December 2010 0–50 BSc, MSc, PhD 1–220
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022998.t001
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elicitation protocol and group discussion at each workshop. The
workshops were generally in the areas of animal, plant and human
health, and all were run in Australia or New Zealand. No expert
participated in more than one workshop. In some workshops, most
participants knew one another professionally. In others, most
participants wereunfamiliar withone another, so in these cases peer
ranking was based on a brief verbal summary. The qualitative
outcomes described below were not affected by these differences.
The preliminary information gathering and the first round of
questions (steps 2 to 5 above) were conducted in the first one or
two hours of the workshop. The information was compiled and the
intervals standardized using software developed to support the
procedure. The discussions were conducted and the second (final)
round of answers were gathered in the last hour of the workshop.
The questions varied between workshops to suit the particular
skills of the participants (see Supporting Information S1). There
were some variations in the details of procedures between
workshops; specifically, in workshops 2 and 3, half of the
participants saw the estimates of other participants but did not
discuss differences before making a second judgment. Excluding
people who did not talk with one another made no important
difference to the results reported below.
We scored expertise using three simple measures; years of
experience, number of relevant professional publications, and rank
of highest relevant qualification (no tertiary qualifications=0, any
non-relevant degree=1, relevant non-graduate qualification=2,
relevant degree=3, relevant four-year degree=4, relevant five
year degree (veterinary science, medicine)=5, relevant masters =
6, relevant PhD=7). Experts recorded their years of relevant
experience and the number of professional publications they had
authored or coauthored including peer reviewed papers, books,
book chapters, and official (grey literature) reports.
Evaluation of responses
Accuracy and bias may be measured by the correspondence
between judgments and facts [18], [25], [26]. Calibration reflects
how well the bounds specified by an expert accurately reflect
uncertainty [23]. Evaluation of expert performance is most
commonly done using scoring rules [27], [28], [29], which are
functions that convert information about the expert’s prediction
and the true realization of the event to a reward [28]. Scoring rules
differ primarily by the degree to which they reward and penalize
various types of correspondence, bias and information. Different
approaches are appropriate depending on whether the purpose is
evaluation of performance or aggregation of results [19], [30],
[31], [32]. In this case, the aim is to assess the accuracy of each
expert’s best guess, and we applied calculations to create a
standardized distance from the truth for each person, averaged
over all questions they answered [32].
Scoring rules for point estimates assess performance in terms of
the average distance between the predicted and observed value
across a set of predictions, standardized to account for differences
in question scales [32]. In assessing performance, we were
particularly interested in a measure that allowed performance on
each question to contribute equally. The range of question types
made it difficult for any one standardization method to cope with
the full range of responses. To handle variation in response scales
for each question, we first range-coded the estimates by each
expert for each question. That is, we expressed each answer as,
 r re
i~ re
i{rmin
i
    
rmax
i {rmin
i
  
, ð1Þ
where re
i is the estimate from expert e for question i, rmin
i is the
group minimum for question i and rmax
i is the group maximum of
Table 2. Pearson correlations between peer assessments of expert performance and measures of expertise, and between self-
assessed expertise and peer assessments of expertise.
Workshop
Peer assessment versus
years of experience
Peer assessment versus
number of publications
Peer assessment versus
qualifications
Self assessment versus
peer assessment
1 0.550 (n=20) 0.348 (n=21) 0.556 (n=21) 0.675 (n=21)
2 0.487 (n=19) 0.587 (n=21) 0.064 (n=20) 0.684 (n=24)
3 0.514 (n=13) 20.123 (n=13) 0.019 (n=13) 0.853 (n=13)
4 0.591 (n=25) 0.500 (n=25) 0.489 (n=25) 0.899 (n=25)
5 0.836 (n=20) 0.309 (n=17) 0.203 (n=20) 0.853 (n=20)
6 0.620 (n=14) 0.289 (n=14) 0.074 (n=14) 0.944 (n=14)
Statistically significant correlations (at a=0.05, two-tailed) are in bold face.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022998.t002
Figure 1. Self assessment versus peer assessment of expertise.
Data from all workshops (overall correlation, r=0.85). Peer assessment
is the average of the scores on the 11-point scale provided by each
person’s peers on the day of the workshop. The strong relationship was
consistent across the five groups, where the correlations ranged from
0.67 to 0.94 (Table 3). The dashed line is parity (where self assessment
and peer assessment are equal).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022998.g001
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The standardization ensured that each question contributed more
or less equally to overall assessments of group performance. We
then rescaled the answers, expressing each as the average log-ratio
error (ALRE),
ALREe ~1=N
X N
i~1
log10 xiz1 
re
iz1
        
      ð2Þ
where N is the number of questions given to a workshop group, r is
the standardized prediction and x is the standardized observed
(true) value. The log-ratio provides a measure of deviation of an
expert’s estimate from the true value that is not dominated by a
single prediction far from the observed value. A prediction that is
10-fold greater than the observed value weighs as heavily as a
prediction that is one-tenth the observed value. Smaller ALRE
scores indicate more accurate responses and a perfect ALRE score
would be 0. Using the standardized responses, for any given
question the log ratio scores have a maximum possible range of
0.31 (=log(2)) which occurs when the true answer coincides with
either the group minimum or group maximum.
Commonly applied methods for estimating accuracy include the
Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), which gives the average
percentage difference between the prediction and observed value,
and Root Mean Square Percentage Error (RMAPE), which is the
square root of the MAPE. However, MAPE and RMAPE are
strongly affected by one or a few very divergent responses.
Results
Expectations of performance generally correlated with the
normal measures of expert status, namely, years of experience,
number of publications and academic qualifications (Table 2).
Weak correlations between qualifications and peer assessments in
Workshops 2 and 3 arose because all participants had relevant
postgraduate qualifications, so that participants could not clearly
rank expert status on this basis. The otherwise generally strong
positive correlations (r.0.5) between these factors underline the
structure of the social expectation hypothesis. That is, society and
experts assume that experts have privileged access to knowledge
gained through specialist training and relevant experience and that
they are able to access and use this knowledge effectively.
Experience, track record and qualifications are assumed to be
reliable guides to this expertise.
The community of experts sampled in this study held the
strong belief that more experienced and better-credentialed
experts would perform better. The pervasiveness of this belief
is reflected particularly in the correspondence between self-
assessments and peer assessments of performance where corre-
lations range from 0.68 to 0.94 (Table 2). Figure 1 combines the
six workshops and shows this relationship as a scatter plot. People
tended to rank themselves in a very similar fashion as their peers
ranked them. Perhaps most surprisingly, people established
consistent and highly correlated expectations of performance of
their peers that accorded closely with the self-evaluations, even in
workshops in which the participants were mostly unfamiliar with
one another. These assessments were based on a very brief
introduction (taking about one minute), in which they outlined
their experience, track record and qualifications (Workshops 1
and 5).
Figure 1 also shows that most people’s self-assessments are lower
than the assessments provided by their peers. That is, people
tended to score themselves slightly lower than other people scored
them, on the 11-point scale, perhaps reflecting innate modesty on
the part of most participants, or an innate inflation of other
peoples’ expertise. Despite this overall bias in scaling, the relative
positions of people on the self-assessment and peer assessment axes
were remarkably consistent, reflected in the strength of these
correlations (Table 2).
Levels of modesty declined as status increased. That is, older,
more experienced and better-credentialed people tended to place
themselves slightly closer to the parity line than did younger and
less experienced people (Figure 1).
Table 3. Correlations between peer assessments of expertise and the accuracy of predictions.
Workshop, number of participants,
number of questions
Peer assessment versus prediction
accuracy – first round
Peer assessment versus prediction
accuracy – second round
1, n=21, 10 questions 20.391 0.119
2, n=24, 10 questions 0.215 20.009
3, n=13, 8 questions 0.190 20.470
4, n=25, 5 questions 20.360 20.148
5, n=20, 6 questions 20.305 20.441
6, n=14, 8 questions 20.367 20.332
A negative correlation indicates that more experienced and better-credentialed experts were closer to the truth. A positive correlation indicates the converse. None of
the correlations were statistically significant (at a=0.05, two-tailed).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022998.t003
Figure 2. Peer assessment of expert knowledge versus actual
performance for the participants in Workshop 3. Prediction
accuracy is calculated as ALRE (see text). Small values for prediction
accuracy are better. Closed circles and the solid line are estimates from
round 1 (r=0.19). Crosses and the dashed line are estimates from round
2( r=20.47). Estimates closer to the x-axis indicate the answers are
closer to the truth.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022998.g002
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status (as reflected in the peer assessments) and actual performance
on the questions were consistently weak, ranging from 20.39 to
0.22 on the initial (first round) predictions, and from 20.47 to 0.12
on the final (second round) predictions (Table 3). Individual
average prediction accuracies improved after people had the
opportunity to discuss the context and meaning of questions, and
to see the results of the first predictions from the other experts. For
example, this is reflected in the round 2 (dashed) line in Figure 2
being below the round 1 (solid) line.
In the example in Figure 2, before discussion, reputation was
weakly positively correlated with improved performance (r=0.19).
After discussion, the correlation was the reversed (r=20.47). This
result hinged on several of the most experienced participants who
improved substantially, following clarification and consideration of
other opinions. This example of overall improvement in
performance following discussion emerged in all the workshops
(Figure 3), where the average accuracy of expert judgements
improved substantially following discussion in all cases.
The average estimates performed about as well as, or better
than, the best regarded person in each group (Figure 4), although
in workshop 5, the best regarded person was the second best
performing individual and slightly outperformed the group
average. More importantly, the person with the highest status
often performs poorly, relative to the post-discussion group
average.
Discussion
These results support three important conclusions. Firstly, they
confirm one prediction of the social expectation hypothesis, that peer
assessments of expert status would be strongly associated with
qualifications, track record and experience. Not only does society
expect experts to perform better, but experts themselves believe
they will perform better. These expectations arise because people
believe skill is determined by these factors.
Secondly, in contrast to the social expectation hypothesis, qualifica-
tions, track records and experience often are poor guides to the
performance of scientific experts. Even though each group
contained at least one person who was consistently relatively
accurate, the results show clearly that peer status cannot be used to
identify such people. The only way to identify them is to test
participants.
Thirdly, if experts are given the opportunity to listen to one
another, assess other judgements, and cross examine reasoning
and data within a structured process, their average performance
improves substantially. Additionally, the averages of a group’s
independent best guesses following discussion generally perform at
least as well as, and often much better than the estimates of the
best-regarded person in the group [20].
Figure 3. The group average improvement in accuracy (ALRE)
following discussion. Change in estimates records distance from the
truth, so that more strongly negative values improved more. The dots
are the improvements in averages of best guesses. The error bars are
95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022998.g003
Figure 4. Accuracy of group means compared to highly regarded experts. Mean and 95% confidence intervals of standardized distance
from the truth (ALRE) for the most highly regarded individual in each workshop prior to discussion (‘Highest status’), and the workshop group
average following discussion (‘Group Average’).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022998.g004
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over a set of questions, in all the workshops conducted here. We
speculate that they are general properties of technical expertise.
Others [8], [18], [19] have suggested testing experts routinely
and using these data to weight their judgments about unknowns.
While our results support the general notion of testing and
weighting experts, the prospect of doing this raises challenging
questions. Who sets and administers the tests? Which elements of
expertise should the tests examine? Where do the data come from
to validate the answers? How many test questions are required to
validate an individual’s expertise? How does one overcome the
reluctance of experts to be tested?
The analyses here provide some answers. Regarding setting
tests, the people interested in gathering an accurate set of facts for
an assessment have a mandate to conduct such tests and a
responsibility to eliminate as many arbitrary and misleading
sources of uncertainty as possible. Regarding the scope of the
questions, they should cover the kinds of questions that the experts
will be required to answer to finalize a risk analysis or to make the
decision at hand. Regarding sources of potential questions, they
include hypotheticals, prepublication data, data from previous
case studies that other experts have collected, and data from other
locations or jurisdictions. Regarding reluctance, only one person in
124 participants in these workshops refused to make their
estimates available for discussion and inclusion in this study. It
remains to be seen whether the same responses emerge in other
cultures, disciplines and contexts.
These results reinforce earlier findings that if experts have the
opportunity to enhance their judgment ability through learning,
their performance generally improves [18], [19], [21], [22]. Here,
the experts learned from one another and improved their estimates
rapidly. These earlier studies have shown that practice and
experience alone do not necessarily remove biases. Learning from
private feedback is a slow process requiring many iterations. This
study shows that learning from peers in a facilitated and a
structured environment can accelerate judgment improvement.
In summary traditional measures of expertise such as publica-
tion record and years of experience are unreliable predictors of
accuracy during elicitation exercises. We therefore recommend a
formal and transparent process for the definition and selection of
expert panels, which considers other measures of domain
knowledge. We also recommend the adoption of new professional
standards that employ structured elicitation methods and testing
and feedback of expert judgments. It is anticipated that these will
improve the performance of both experts and elicitation methods
over time.
Supporting Information
Supporting Information S1 The information outlines two
example questions that represent the style of the test
questions used in the six workshops; one example
question is for weed ecologists and the other for health
epidemiologists.
(DOC)
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